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ABSTRACT 
 
In the Chinese context of economic reform and restructuring to establish the modern corporate 
system, new models of executives’ equity-based revenue are tested. Stock option income is 
currently becoming a critical part in the whole package offering to the executives. In this 
research, we examine the influential factors of executives’ equity-based revenue in 127 Chinese-
listed companies. It appears that business performance is positively related to executives’ equity-
based compensation, that there is no significant correlation between executives’ equity-based 
compensation and corporate size, that industry is an influential factor of executives’ equity-based 
compensation, and that there is no significant correlation between executives’ equity-based 
compensation and tenure. Based on these findings, we suggest future improvements to establish a 
healthier equity incentive system in China. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
tock option income has currently accounted for a critical part in the whole package offered to executives. 
Its development, to some extent, fully proved the necessity of long-term incentives to managers, in 
particular to the chief executive officers (CEO) since stock price reflects the long-term investment value 
of the firm in the efficient capital market (Chidambaran and Nagpurnanand, 2003; Johnson and Tian, 2000; Peterson 
et al., 2002; Ross, 2004). If the manager’s attention is directed to short-term profit, then the means of strengthening 
the competency of the company, such as research and development, training employees, market expanding, and his 
own income, will apparently be limited to the short-term compensation as salary and bonus. The lack of foresight 
reflecting those practises could be avoided by long-term incentive instruments, which would link the company’s 
development with the executive’s personal growth in terms of both career and financial security (Cadenillas et al., 
2004; Carpenter, 2000; Liu et al., 2011; Sircar and Xiong, 2007). 
 
Currently in China, this is a crucial time for economic reform and restructuring to establish a modern 
corporate system adapted to the Chinese reality. In particular, the development of compensation system for public-
listed companies is a key priority for corporate governance. This issue demands consideration of both Western 
theory and practice and the Chinese perspective. In 1997, Shanghai Jinling and Yidian Holding, two listed 
companies affiliated with Shanghai Electronics Holding Group, began to adopt the stock option plan, which made 
them pioneers of Chinese stock option revolution. From then on, companies in the cities of Shanghai, Beijing, 
Wuhan, Shenzhen, and Shenyang carried out their own compensation proposals with experimental stock options, 
resulting in beneficial effects and the accumulation of a great deal of practical experience.  
 
This paper describes an empirical test of practices of equity-based compensation for executives in Chinese 
publicly-listed companies and answers the following questions in order to find the internal economic rules and 
existing problems in the current practice:  
 
S 
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1. What determines the executives’ equity-based compensation? 
2. Do Chinese stock market practices support the theoretically deduced determinants? 
3. Are there additional factors not yet unidentified? 
 
The structure of the paper is organized in four parts. The first part aims to review the relevant literature in 
order to define the hypotheses of the research. The second part presents the research method, the data source and the 
variables. The third part provides the results of the research and the fourth part is a discussion based on the issues 
and implications of the research. In the conclusion, we offer several suggested improvements consistent with the 
Chinese context. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW - DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE’S STOCK OPTIONS 
 
North American and European researchers have carried out a great deal of empirical research on the 
determinants of executives’ equity compensation, such as CEO performance, governance structure, CEO’s personal 
characteristics, and firm size. Similar research in China has emerged only in recent years by figuring out a 
reasonable compensation system for top management, which became a sensitive topic out of interest to all levels of 
society (Li and Caiping, 2007; Wei, 2000; Yang & Ma, 2005; Zhou, 2003). 
 
Performance-compensation Sensitivity  
 
Principal-agency theory indicates that an important aspect of agent incentive is to agree on compensation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Researchers have already established the optimal compensation contract on the basis 
of this theoretical angle. Agency theory predicts that CEOs should be motivated to act in their shareholders’ interest 
by incentive contracts, with compensation related to business performance. Thus, compensation packages are 
heavily dependent on the firm’s stock price, which is viewed as a summary statistic of the CEO’s performance. 
Although this concept is theoretically precise and reasonable, it is rather difficult or even impossible to manipulate 
in practice because it is based on the assumption that the following two conditions occur simultaneously. One 
condition is that the enterprise is thoroughly and totally under the control of the CEO. If this is not met, managers 
will receive profit from other means, such as collectivity consumption. The other condition is that managers are 
forbidden to resign and leave the company. If they could, they are then entitled to bargain with prospective 
employers or simply choose to leave if they could not agree with the owners. Based on the assumption that the 
principals could only reward or punish the agents by the observed outcome index (performance), Western scholars 
have emphasized empirical examination on performance-compensation sensitivity and tried to demonstrate that 
there is a close relationship between these two factors. Consequently, we should have sufficient evidence to reward 
managers according to their contributions (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; McConvill, 2005). 
 
However, the empirical results turned out differently. The most important reason lies in the variety of study 
methods, including different ways of collecting data, analysing statistics, selecting samples and periods, as well as 
the existence of adjustment variables and co-linearity (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). In the end, most of these studies 
reached the conclusion that the assumption of correlation between performance and executive compensation was not 
significant (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Mcknight et al., 1996).  
 
Governance Structure and Executive Compensation  
 
The design of executive compensation is regarded not only as an instrument for solving the agency problem 
between managers and shareholders, but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded 
companies with dispersed ownership cannot be expected to bargain at arm’s length with managers. Managers wield 
substantial influence over their own pay. As long as the shareholders could effectively influence managers’ 
compensation, or if there were watchdogs who could monitor managers’ decision-making procedures, perhaps 
excessive compensation could be avoided and managers’ total compensation would not deviate too far from indexes 
of enterprise performance. However, pay will be higher and/or less sensitive to performance in firms in which 
managers have relatively more power. Other conditions being equal, managers would tend to have more power 
when: (1) the board is relatively weak or ineffective, (2) there are no large outside shareholders, (3) there are fewer 
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institutional shareholders, or (4) managers are protected by anti-takeover arrangements (Core and Guay, 1999; 
Cragg and Dyck, 2000; Cyert et al., 2002). 
 
Other empirical studies testing the conclusion of managerial power theory focus on the sensitivity analysis 
concerning the decision function of the corporate governance structure on the compensation issue. Because the 
corporate governance structure determines the degree of supervision on managers, the relationship between 
performance and compensation is adjusted by corporate monitoring technology. Theoretically, large shareholders 
have the ability to punish and reward the managers; therefore, there must be some relationship between executive’s 
compensation and the proportion of large shareholders in the board (Benz et al., 2001; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2001; Cycert et al., 2002).  
 
CEO’s Personal Characteristics-compensation Correlation 
 
Ciscel and Carroll (1980) view CEO human capital as another crucial determinant of CEO compensation. 
Age, tenure and educational experience are the representative variables of human capital in their studies. For 
instance, Murphy (1986) found that the longer the tenure, the more knowledge the owner or board would have and 
the less necessary would be the link between the enterprise’s performance and the manager’s compensation. Hill and 
Phan (1991) believed that the longer the managers’ tenure, the more stable then is his position and the more ability 
they would have in weakening the relationship between performance and compensation. Hartzell (1998) separated 
the incentive tenure into a position-ceasing incentive, career incentive and performance incentive, corresponding to 
the executive about to be retire, tenure foreseer and the executive with infinite tenure. When executives calculate the 
probability of being terminated, their performance-compensation sensitivity, as well as manager’s momentum of 
getting high compensation through sound performance, is less. Thus, the incentive system performance link 
becomes less efficient or inefficient.  
 
Firm Size and Executive Compensation 
 
Empirical studies commonly support a strong correlation between size and executive compensation. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) deemed that since corporate essence and product market were settled, there existed an 
optimal corporate size and executive equity granting level. If the former was larger, the latter would be higher. 
Smith and Watts (1992) argued that larger companies demanded managers with more talent. Therefore, managers in 
larger companies should have higher equity-based compensation. Under the classical assumption about the manager 
function related with risk-taking and corporate size, the empirical result found by Himmelber et al. (1999) was that 
the equity incentive level would be decreased as the corporate size became larger. Core and Guay (1999) used the 
logarithm of stock price to operationalize corporate size, which confirmed Himmelber et al. findings (1999). Under 
different capital structures, the best compensation for executives is different. In enterprises with a high liability ratio, 
compensation-performance sensitivity of executives is particularly low. Industrial structure and pressure of 
restriction are decisive predictable variables of executive’s compensation. In restricted industry, managers’ income 
is usually lower than their counterparts. 
 
Equity Incentive in China 
 
Chinese scholars started to carry out the empirical studies on determinants of executive compensation in the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century. Through statistical analysis and empirical work, they have reached many conclusions 
based on Chinese contemporary situations and raised a great amount of recommendations. It has been proven by 
econometric results that there are certain kinds of correlation between executive’s compensations and the corporate 
performance, governance character, managers’ feature and corporate size (Zhang and Tao, 2002; Zhou and Sun, 
2003). 
 
To sum up, Chinese studies agree on the following conclusions: (1) there was no or a small correlation 
between an executive’s compensation and performance; (2) there was a significant positive correlation between 
executive compensation and enterprise size; (3) executive shareholding was not related with enterprise performance, 
and the effect of the equity incentive was not obvious and (4) there was a positive correlation between an 
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executive’s compensation and his tenure (Li and Wang, 2007; Peng, 2006; Xie, 2004; Yu and Peng , 2001; Zhang, 
2003; Zhou, 2003).   
 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
This paper focuses on the study of the influential factors of stock option compensation for executives in 
China, mainly using multiple liner regression method and based on the theory of model impact assessment. Based on 
the literature review, enterprise performance, size, corporate industry, managers’ human capital, and the 
corporation’s governance structure mostly affect executives’ total remuneration. The current stock option system in 
China is only beginning, unlike the established practice in Western countries. However, this kind of system has 
existed in China’s stock market in terms of performance stock, virtual options and some other alternative stock sorts. 
Our research tests five hypothesizes to study the relationships between executives’ stock option revenue and 
companies’ performance, corporate size, managers’ human capital and corporate governance structure of Chinese-
listed companies. We establish models and use real data in financial reports of Chinese-listed companies to carry out 
our empirical tests. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is significant positive correlation between executives’ stock option income and corporate 
operation performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The size of the company is positively related with executives’ stock option income. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The nature of the industry that the company is in will have impact on executives’ stock option 
income.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Executives’ tenure will have impact on executives’ stock option revenue. 
 
Hypothesis 5: For the fifth hypothesis, two sub-hypotheses are offered:  1) Hypothesis 5(A) - the higher the 
proportion of independent directors of the board, the lower the stock option compensation will be 
and 2) Hypothesis 5(B) - the higher the proportion of institutional shareholders, the lower the 
stock option compensation will be. 
 
METHOD 
 
Data Source 
 
In order to test the above hypotheses, we employed archival data from the 2006 financial reports of 127 
companies issued from the Chinese Shanghai stock market. Until 2008, there are totally about 840 listed companies 
whose shares are being traded in this stock market. The selection criteria used to create the sample is companies 
where executives were granted stock option compensation, such as stock options, phantom stock or appreciation 
stock right as our study sample. We excluded firms that carried out such equity-based incentive plans as increased 
share holdings because of management acquisition, employee shared ownership plans, equity incentive plan 
focusing on subsidiary companies. We also excluded companies where the CEO possessed the equity as a result of 
being granted original shares due as a founder-member of the company. 
 
Secondly, given the adverse effect on statistical results caused by extreme value, we excluded the 
corporations with poor operation performance. Also, we excluded the companies that were given a reserved audit 
opinion, refusal audit opinion and negative audit opinion. We only selected companies with yearly revenue of more 
than 400 million Yuan in order to make sure the company had the capacity to prove the possibility of establishing a 
healthy and modern enterprise system. 
 
Thirdly, in the sample, we excluded companies in which the president also assumes the position of CEO, or 
in which CEO is actually the company controller. We tried to select those companies in which there exist checks and 
balances on the CEO.  
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Selecting 127 listed companies as our study sample in accordance with the above principles, we almost 
cover all the Chinese-listed companies in Shanghai stock market which have carried out equity-based incentives.  
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Equity-based Incentive Compensation 
 
Given the nascence of Chinese-equity incentive system practices, we selected two factors common to most 
Chinese-listed companies: holding shares and stock price. Like Himmelberg et al. (1999), we define executives’ 
stock option compensation as 1% of the product of executives’ current year’s share volume and the closing price on 
the final trade day of the year.  
 
The equation is：Equity-based Compensation (EBC) = Executives’ Shareholding Volume X Stock Price 
X1％.  
 
According to the data sample, the variable EBC is specified as 1% of the product of executives’ share 
holding volume on Dec. 31, 2006 and the stock closing price for the year 2006. 
 
Performance of Listed Company 
 
Performance is operationalized here as Return on Equity (ROE). As a financial index, ROE not only 
considers time factors, but also ignores the influence of size.  
 
Enterprise Size 
 
Following Wei (2000) and Zhang (2003), we employ Total Capital as the representative index of Size.  
 
Executive’s Tenure 
 
Executive tenure, in this study, refers to the total tenure of executives that will be traced from the 2005 
financial report.  
 
Enterprise Industry 
 
We employed a dummy variable called IND as the shortened form of industry. We divided listed 
companies into 18 different industries: Agriculture, Building, Comprehensive Industry, Daily Consumables, Dealer 
and Agent, Financial Industry, Information Technology, Logistic, Manufacture Industry, Pharmaceuticals Industry, 
Power Industry, Raw Materials, Real Estate, Retail, Telecom, Textile, Transportation and the Travel Industry. We 
first calculated the average Equity-based Compensation (EBC) for each industry and ranked them in descending 
order. Then we gave every industry a value between 18 and 1; this value represents the industry influential power 
according to this descending order, as seen in Table 1. 
 
Independent Director Proportion 
 
 The proportion of independent directors is defined as a percentage of the number of total board of directors. 
 
Institutional Shareholder Proportion 
 
Institutional shareholder proportion (ISP) was chosen to determine whether executive stock option 
compensation is affected when institutions buy liquid shares, which changes the equity structure and corporate 
governance. Therefore, ISP, in this study, refers to the A share proportion held by institutions, which includes 
exchanges, funds, companies’ credit, and finance, in the top 10 shareholder list exposed in the financial reports. 
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Table 1:  IND Variable (Institutional Shareholder Proportion) 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In this research, we used prior main research methods used by Gang (2000), yet we expanded the number of 
independent variables to get a wider test range and higher probability to find the most determinative factors. 
Therefore, we established a multiple-linear regression model to test the hypotheses.  
 
In the model, stock option compensation (EBC) is the dependent variable. Performance (ROE), size (SIZE), 
human capital (TENURE), Industry (IND), proportion of independent directors (IDP) and proportion of institutional 
shareholders (ISP) are independent variables.    
 
The model is: 
 
 
 
 
We used the method least-square of multiple-liner regression as solution and SPSS statistical software to 
deal with our data. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Analysis  
 
Multiple regression analysis was employed with a sample of relevant economic data from 127 listed 
companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange market. By testing the relation between the dependent variable Equity-
based Compensation (EBC) and the independent variables ROE (representing business performance), Total Capital 
(representing enterprise size), Executive’s tenure (representing executives’ human capital), IND (measuring the 
influential degree on EBC in 18 different industries), Independent Director Proportion, and Institutional Shareholder 
Proportion, we have validated some of our hypotheses. 
 
Analysis of the statistic results is as follows: 
 
 The business performance variable – ROE - is positively related to executives’ equity-based compensation 
as indicated in Table 2. This result supports the classical economic theory, thus confirms Hypothesis 1. 
 
The research result did not support Hypothesis 2. There is no significant correlation between executives’ 
equity-based compensation and corporate size (see Table 2). When Total Capital did not correlate, we also tried an 
alternative variable, such as main revenue. One possible explanation is that the relative index is more important than 
the absolute volume. Secondly, previous studies mainly focused on executives’ whole yearly compensation. 
Therefore, the results they obtained showed that corporate size had a positive influence on CEO compensation, 
while the research only takes equity-based compensation as a dependent variable. This is the main distinctive part. 
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Observing the result of the relationship between equity-based compensation and industry (see Table 2), we 
find that when we took industry as a dummy variable and gave each industry a value to represent its influential 
power according to a certain classification and order, the differences among industries appeared and the differences 
variation is in accordance with the variation of equity-based compensation. Thus, Hypothesis 3 has been supported. 
Industry, indeed, is an influential factor of executive equity-based compensation. 
 
There is no significant correlation between executives’ equity-based compensation and tenure (see Table 2). 
The tenure variable in this study is a representative variable of Human Capital. Tenure is more readily collected 
from public information. The statistical result demonstrated that tenure does not adequately represent the variable 
Human Capital. Hypothesis 4 needs to be tested using a different measure. 
 
Correlation between executives’ equity-based compensation and independent director proportion, as well as 
correlation between executives’ equity-based compensation and institutional shareholding proportion, have not 
passed the statistic test (see Table 2). We also found no significant evidence in the test of the relation between 
institutional shares proportion and senior management compensation. 
 
Table 2:  Correlations 
 EBC ROE(%) Size Tenure IDP ISP IND 
Pearson  
Correlation 
EBC 1.000 .226 .029 .072 .092 .046 .397 
ROE(%) .226 1.000 -.003 -.012 -.054 .244 -.038 
Size .029 -.003 1.000 .119 .010 .101 -.080 
Tenure .072 -.012 .119 1.000 .030 -.006 .025 
IDP .092 -.054 .010 .030 1.000 -.123 .053 
ISP .046 .244 .101 -.006 -.123 1.000 -.048 
IND .397 -.038 -.080 .025 .053 -.048 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) EBC . .005 .375 .210 .152 .304 .000 
ROE(%) .005 . .486 .449 .273 .003 .336 
Size .375 .486 . .092 .456 .130 .188 
Tenure .210 .449 .092 . .369 .473 .389 
IDP .152 .273 .456 .369 . .085 .279 
ISP .304 .003 .130 .473 .085 . .295 
IND .000 .336 .188 .389 .279 .295 . 
N EBC 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
ROE(%) 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Size 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Tenure 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
IDP 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
ISP 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
IND 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
 
 Finally, as shown in Table 3 and 4, there exists a multiple liner regression correlation between the 
dependent variable EBC and the independent variables ROE and IND. The regression results exhibit a substantial 
explanatory power. We employed stepwise method in the multiple regressions to select variables. Variable Size 
Tenure, IDP and ISP have been excluded from the final regression formula during the procedure of statistical 
analysis for not passing the F test. The only variables entering into the model are variables IND presenting industry 
differences and ROE presenting corporate performance. 
 
Table 3: Variables Entered/Removed 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
IND . 
Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050, 
Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100). 
2 
ROE(%) . 
Stepwise (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .050, 
Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .100). 
a  Dependent Variable: EBC 
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Table 4:  ANOVA 
Model  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 402702507.927 1 402702507.927 23.159 .000(a) 
 Residual 2156213679.794 124 17388819.998   
 Total 2558916187.721 125    
2 Regression 552140978.749 2 276070489.374 16.921 .000(b) 
 Residual 2006775208.973 123 16315245.601   
 Total 2558916187.721 125    
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Results 
 
The analysis of data yields a deeper understanding of executive equity-based earnings, both globally and in 
the specific market of China. 
 
Agency theory is taken for granted as the fundamental theory in explaining the compensation arrangement 
of operating managers in companies where ownership and operation rights are separated. During the period from the 
end of the 1960s to the end of the 1990s, this theory could not be tested through empirical tests with Western data.  
In most of the studies, an executive’s total compensation was treated as the dependent variable. McKnight et al. 
(1996) first separated executive salary from bonuses, finding a significant positive relation between the bonus and 
corporate performance. Griner (1995) pointed out that it was wrong to mingle different kinds of compensation 
because long-term and short-term compensation are different; therefore, their influence factors may not be the same. 
Stock options are improved incentive instruments utilized in latter times. Theoretically, they will have more links 
with corporate performance than bonuses as they are designed to stimulate top managers to combine their own 
interests with those of shareholders. Thus, it seems normal to get statistical results supporting agency theory from an 
effective capital market.  
 
Size, as Conyon and Leech (1994), Garen (1994), Gregg et al. (1993) concluded, has a positive relation 
with executives’ total package, but it will not be a good explanatory factor for long-term incentive compensation. 
Both of these two relationships were testified with the Chinese data market. We consider this as a fairly good result 
that demonstrates a positive development being processed in the Chinese financial environment. In 2006, a reform 
verifying stock liquidity took place in China. This share merger reform released abundant shares from trading 
limitations and is viewed as a milestone in discovering the investment value of the Chinese stock market. As stock 
prices gradually return to their investment value, equity-based compensation will extend greater incentive power in 
the near future. 
 
The hypothesis that the degree of corporate governance will impact executives’ equity compensation is an 
extension proposition of agency theory. Most empirical studies have shown that agency theory explains a part of the 
executives’ compensation. Therefore, corporate governance structure must serve as part of the influence effect. In 
studies done in Western countries (David et al., 1998; Weisbach, 1988), it was proven that the existence of 
institutional investors and independent directors made sure that executives’ compensation is more closely related 
with corporate performance. In the Chinese market, we did not find a similar result. 
 
According to Xie (2004), when the board of directors actually owns the claim on the residual of the 
enterprise, an independent director, in essence, is a manager and one part of the agent problem. In China, relevant 
departments did not realize this issue, which is the key reason for the absence of a significant relationship between 
independence of independent directors and corporate performance. Since we tested whether executives’ equity-
based compensation is positively related to corporate performance, it is apparent that in the current China stock 
market, the independent directors do not affect executive’s compensation level. To some extent, they may have the 
same interests as managers do.  
 
Chinese researchers also did several studies on institutional investors’ developments. Li and Caiping (2007) 
found that in the Chinese stock market, not all shares could be traded freely. Under “one share has one decision-
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making right” system, institutional investors, which are referred to as fund companies in particular, can hardly have 
claim to express their opinions on important issues of corporate development for owning less shares under such a 
circumstance. 
 
It is difficult to accurately valuate human capital, which is so comprehensive and intangible. Using only one 
variable may not be sufficient. That’s why Western researchers (Hartzell, 1998; Hill and Phan 1991; Murphy, 1986) 
have failed to reach such consensus, even for the factor of tenure. Therefore, a model for valuing human capital 
needs to be employed in subsequent research. 
 
Industry is an experimental variable that yielded positive but unsurprising results. Every industry is at a 
different stage in its life cycle. Some are in the sunrise period, while others are in the sunset period. This gives rise 
to significant differences among industries in terms of probability, administrative habits and incentive momentum. 
We believe the industry factor will continue to play an influential role in the long run as long as the process of 
averaging the profitability exists, and many new industries will emerge with the rapid development of science and 
technology. 
 
In addition, the issue of executive compensation is not simply an agency theory problem, a managerial 
power problem, or a human capital problem, but also a problem influenced by multiple factors. These factors 
include nationality, region, politics, society, culture, outside environment of the corporation, corporate performance, 
corporate nature (ownership), corporate industry, corporate governance, executives’ characters, etc. Therefore, there 
exists much scope for further study in this field.  
 
Implications 
 
From a global point of view based on the above discussion, we would like to suggest that companies, 
especially multinational corporations, further investigate whether their executives’ equity-based compensation plan 
could be improved by giving more consideration to the national, institutional and cultural factors to improve the 
compensation system. 
 
China is undergoing economic transformations. All capital resources are in the process of reevaluation, as is 
human capital. There is a trend that Chinese human capital will be further recognized and more accurately valuated. 
Professional managers today receive more recognition by the market than 10 years ago. Generally speaking, the total 
environmental factors in China are changing and China will gradually become more market-oriented as GDP grows. 
 
However, the current context in which executive reward is embedded in China still lies in the shadow of a 
planned economy. As the State is also the owner of large SOEs, it has the power to appoint and reward managers 
through the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.  
 
Learning from foreign large companies with advanced management systems, Chinese companies, 
especially experimental pioneers, which are listed on stock exchanges, are trying to establish the so called modern 
enterprise system. Several new approaches have been tested. Some of the experiments have resulted in failures 
because of the inappropriate adaptation, while others, like equity-based long-term incentive, are helping to achieve 
high-level business results.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the above analysis, we suggest future improvements of the current situation in order to establish a 
healthier equity incentive system that will be more appropriate to the Chinese current condition.  
 
First, establish a more normative human resource market, especially for senior management, so as to 
capitalize their value. Executives are generally nominated or appointed by superiors rather than openly recruited 
from the human resource market. Furthermore, their compensation is not decided according to the market level. As 
China deepens its economic reforms, all relevant capital allocated to the market needs to be established and 
improved. The human capital market inevitably becomes the key area of development in the next step. 
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Second, keep enhancing the operation as well as governance quality of listed companies. In our study, we 
witnessed some impressive progress of the managerial competence in Chinese-listed companies. However, in 
Chinese companies, there are still some unresolved management issues that will hamper further development, such 
as issues of insider control and outsider internalization. This raises the problem of insider control which mainly 
refers to the phenomena that management or labor, that has grasped the residual claim of non human resource 
capital, will naturally seek their individual interests. In China, the situation is more complex. It is the representatives 
from State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission who occupy the position of the capital 
owner. The current practice of one representative having the responsibility of supervising several SOEs causes the 
actual problem of investor vacancy. It gives executives who work in listed companies owned by the state much 
freedom to seek their own benefits. Therefore, it is very important to modify the current supervision system to give 
actual owners more power in determining the compensation of the managers they employ. 
 
Third, perfect the rules and regulations of equity incentive systems. In the year 2006, most listed companies 
in the Shanghai and Shenzhen security exchange markets executed the share merger reform. Along with this reform, 
the equity incentive plan was also spread out as a way to receive these shares. As it is the big official beginning of 
such an incentive trend, rules and regulations need to be produced ahead of execution. 
 
Finally, continue to cultivate the capital market and more mature institutional investors in the Chinese 
exchange market. The Chinese economy is subject to a period of high speed GDP growth but with a low-efficiency 
financial market. Without an efficient capital market, corporate value will not be discovered and rationally reflected. 
Cultivating the capital market means developing a healthier administration system, introducing a value investment 
environment, and improving the relevant law system. It is also important to develop mature Chinese institutional 
investors. Large fund companies and insurance companies are to be developed as a priority objective and the key 
developmental direction is to let these institutional investors not only take the responsibility of managing the agent 
fund, but also to be involved in the supervision and administration of the shareholding companies. 
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